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This paper investigates the relationship between various socioeconomic factors and crime, 
especially income inequality and poverty.  As crime rates have steadily increased over time, 
ecological theories of crime have been developed to explain the behavior of both property 
crime and violent crime.  Identifying possible predictors of crime is one step into developing 
social policies that will help lower the vast social costs of criminal activity.  The first part of 
this paper discusses the three major ecological theories thought to best explain crime (strain 
theory, social disorganization theory, and economic theory).  The second part uses county-
level data from the state of Texas to explore the links between likely socioeconomic factors 
and crime rates.  Our analysis provides evidence that inequality is unlikely to be a constantly 
significant factor in determining property crime rates but does have a significant impact on 
violent crime.  Family instability is the most consistently significant determinant of both 
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1.  Introduction. 
  
Crime has enormous negative implications for society.  Not only does it affect society 
in terms of money—spent in order to apprehend and punish criminals or to help repair 
damage done from criminal activity—but also in terms of personal safety and happiness.  
Since part of a government’s job is to protect its citizens, crafting efficient social policies to 
help minimize the effects of crime is a common objective of governing bodies.  Identifying 
the determinants of crime is an important step to achieving this end. 
 Although criminal intent was once thought to be largely a personal problem—brought 
on by weak morals or insanity—more recent theories focus on ecological causes.  These 
theories suggest that people are driven to crime through environmental stimuli rather than 
internal urges, and therefore, by controlling these outside influences, crime can be reduced.  
The three most prominent ecological theories are strain theory, social disorganization theory, 
and the economic theory of crime.  These theories consider both economic and social 
variables, income inequality included. 
 This paper looks at the relationship of many socioeconomic variables to crime: 
income inequality, population density, unemployment, race, poverty levels, family instability, 
residential stability, police expenditures, female-male ratios, education, gun ownership, and 
religious participation.  We will look at data for all Texas counties to investigate the links 
between these variables and crime.  Limiting the sample to one state helps lower the impact 
of demographic (and associated characteristics) and legislative differences found across US 
states. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents basic demographic and 
legislative information on the state of Texas that might affect crime rates.  Section 3 presents 
a brief synopsis of Becker’s (1968) economic theory of crime, and Section 4 continues with a 
literature review of theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of crime.  Section 5 
introduces our data, and Section 6 describes our data in more detail.   Section 7 presents our 









2.  Welcome to Texas. 
 
In this paper, we analyze data for 254 Texas counties, which in total cover a land area 
of 261,797.12 square miles (678,051.43 square kilometers) and have a total population of 
20,851,820 persons. 
The data sample has been restricted to one state in order to help minimize the effects 
that cultural variations, differing demographics, and state-specific laws have on crime.  While 
it is true that the areas of Texas are hardly homogeneous (for instance, compare northern 
Williamson County’s 74% white non-Hispanic population and 5% poverty rate with Webb 
County, located in south Texas near the Mexican border, whose population is 94% Hispanic 
and has a poverty rate of 31%), these counties are much more likely to be similar to each 
other—especially in terms of legislation—than are counties chosen far and wide across the 
United States as they are in other empirical studies (Sjoquist (1973) or Kelly (2000), for 
example).    
Texas’ demographics differ greatly from that of the United States.  Its Hispanic 
population is far greater than that of the country taken as a whole, which presents different 
cultural elements as well as different issues among races than are present elsewhere.  In 2000, 
the US population measured 69.1% white non-Hispanic, 12.5% Hispanic, and 12.3% black.  
Texas, however, is 52.4% white non-Hispanic, 32% Hispanic, and 11.5% black.  Other 
demographic differences include age—the US 15-24 age bracket stood at 13.9% in 2000, 
compared to Texas’ 15.2%—and the percentage of the population in female-headed 
households.  In 2000, 7.9% of family households were female-headed with minor children, 
while in Texas the percentage was 4.5. 
Texas’ legislation may also have an impact on its crime rate.  Criminal punishments 
are regulated to some degree at the state level, and may vary with other states.  Gun laws also 
vary widely across the US.  Owning a gun has always been legal in Texas, and in 1995 the 
state legislature approved concealed carry laws, which allows those who obtain a Concealed 
Handgun License (CHL) to carry a firearm on their person in public.  Other states have 
various limits on weapons: for instance, Illinois is a complete no-carry state, while Vermont 
requires no permit to carry and other states fall somewhere in between.  Texas also has a 
Castle Doctrine in place which allows individuals to use lethal force to defend their person 
and property, which is well-known by residents.  There is no definitive data to determine 
whether these laws raise or lower crime rates, but it is likely these laws do affect an 
individual’s choice of whether or not to participate in criminal activity. 
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3. The Economic Theory of Crime. 
 
 Although Fleisher (1966) was the first economist to attempt to look at crime from an 
economic perspective and supposed that if the possibility of getting caught was relatively low 
and gains from legal market activity were not high enough, then some people would engage 
in criminal activity, it is Becker’s 1968 paper “Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach” that is considered the beginning of the economic theory of crime.  He developed a 
model that took into account both the individual’s incentives to commit crime as well as 
deterrents and also the costs of crime to society. 
Becker describes an individual’s choice to commit crime with the function 
 
Oj = Oj(pj, fj, uj,) 
 
where O is the number of offenses an individual would commit, p is the probability of his 
conviction, f is the punishment if he is convicted, and u is a variable representing all other 
factors that influences the decision to commit crime (for instance, income available through 
legal ventures and income available through criminal activities). 
 Because the individual’s choice is made under uncertainty, the expected utility of 
criminal activity can be described as 
 
EUj = pjUj(Yj – fj) + (1 – pj)Uj(Yj) 
 
where Yj is the individual’s income from committing a crime.  As is evident in the equation, 
not only is the expected utility dependent upon income gained from crime, but also the 
probabilities of conviction pj versus success (1 – pj) and punishment fj. 
 Crime does not only affect the perpetrators.  Crime also affects society, and Becker 
defines the social loss function as 
 
L = D(O) + C(p, O) + bfpO 
 
where D is the damage from crime, C is the cost of apprehension and conviction of criminals, 
and bfpO is the total social loss from punishments.  b is the coefficient that reflects the cost to 
society that takes into account not only monetary costs, but also societal values—fines would 
show b close to zero, while imprisonment and most other punishments would show b > 1.  
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 The main aim of social policy is to protect citizens, and that includes protecting 
citizens from crime.  In this function of social loss, social policy variables are represented by 
p and f.  By minimizing this equation with respect to p and f and solving the model, we can 
determine how to minimize the impact of crime on society by raising or lowering the risks 
involved with committing crimes. 
 However, another way of accomplishing this could be by changing the variables that 
affect an individual’s choice to commit crime (represented by u in Becker’s model).  For 
instance, increasing the opportunities available to him through legal market activity may 
make the opportunity cost of criminal activity high enough to make illegal activities too 
costly to pursue. 
 Ehrlich (1973) continues that analysis and investigates how income levels and 
distributions may affect crime.  He argues that income inequality can be an indicator of 
possible payoffs between legal and illegal activity, and that income levels can indicate the 
number of opportunities to commit crime (compared to those available through legitimate 
activity).  By extension, then, controlling income levels (for instance, by helping those on the 
low end of the income distribution increase their income) or controlling inequality might also 
























The study of crime is not limited to only one field, and the links between crime and 
various socioeconomic variables have been studied from many different points of view.  As a 
result, several different theories have been developed to explain these relationships.  Merton’s 
(1938) strain theory, Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, and Becker’s 
(1968) economic theory of crime are three influential ecological theories of crime, all of 
which use the incentives, deterrents, and other influences found in an individual’s 
environment to give possible explanations for varying crime rates.  Inequality figures heavily 
into each of these theories, especially strain theory and economic theory. 
Strain theory suggests that individuals feel more frustration when placed near others 
who are more successful; as inequality increases, those on the lower end of the income 
distribution are more likely to channel their anger and resentment into crime.   
Social disorganization theory argues that as the communities become less able to 
regulate its members, crime increases.  Factors that contribute to this community weakening 
include poverty, racial heterogeneity, less residential stability, and family instability (the 
former three determinants are noted by Shaw and McKay (1942), while family instability was 
first noted as a possible factor by Kornhauser (1978)).  Inequality is considered to have an 
impact here because of its link to poverty. 
The economic theory of crime is the most recently developed, and Becker’s paper has 
had a significant impact on the way criminal behavior is viewed.  Rather than considering 
criminal behaviors as the result of mental or moral deficiencies, they are now considered as a 
possible result of a utility maximization problem: the individual considers crime by 
comparing his possible returns from criminal activity (taking into account the possibility of 
being apprehended and the resulting punishment) against the returns he would receive from 
participating in legal market activity. 
The economic theory of crime considers inequality important because areas with high 
income inequality mean individuals with low returns from legal market activity are closer to 
those who have higher returns and thus have goods worth taking.  This situation increases the 
possible returns on time and effort placed in criminal activity.  Therefore, lowering crime 
rates can be achieved by reducing the relative benefits of criminal behavior: by either 
reducing the gains from crime, raising the probability of being caught and increasing the 
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severity of punishment, or by making the opportunities of legal market activity more 
attractive and more widely available.   
Other authors have continued the development of Becker’s theory.  Ehrlich (1973), 
Sjoquist (1973), and Block and Heineke (1975) were all early followers of Becker’s 
economic theory of crime.  Ehrlich considered the effects of income levels and income 
distribution might have on crime rates, and found that higher median family incomes were 
associated with higher levels of violent crime, and the percentage of families with incomes 
below one-half of the median income was also associated with higher crime rates.  He also 
found that unemployment rates were less important than other factors.  Sjoquist’s model 
showed individuals choosing how to allocate their fixed amount of time to either legal or 
criminal market activities, and considered arrest, conviction, and punishment to be the costs 
of criminal activities.  As Becker’s model suggested, Sjoquist’s empirical testing of his model 
demonstrated that an increase in the number of arrests compared to the number of crimes led 
to lower crime rates.   
In all of the previously mentioned models that are concentrated on the economic 
theory of crime, inequality is considered to be a very important determinant of crime.  Chiu 
and Madden (1998) develop a model that details the link between the number of burglaries 
and income distributions; as inequality increases, burglaries also increase.  İmrohoroğlu, 
Merlo, and Rupert (2004) present a dynamic equilibrium model and then analyze property 
crime rates in the United States.  They hoped to identify the factors that led to the drastic 
decrease in crime.  They concluded that higher probability of being caught, a stronger 
economy, and the aging of the population are important factors, while unemployment is not 
significant.  Inequality, however, is a very important determinant of crime; if everything else 
had remained constant, the increase in income inequality would have caused a sharp increase 




Several empirical studies corroborate the claim that inequality is an important 
determinant of crime.  Morgan Kelly (2000) examines the link between inequality and crime 
in metropolitan counties in the US in 1991.  He considers violent crime and property crime 
separately, and controls for other factors that may also have an impact on crimes: police 
activity, poverty, unemployment, family structure, race, residential mobility, age, and 
education.  In his first model, he assumes that police expenditures are exogenous and uses a 
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logistic regression to estimate the model.  In a second regression, he assumes that police 
expenditures may be endogenous, and then uses a two-stage GMM regression.  Both 
regressions give similar results.  While violent crime is heavily influenced by inequality and 
less so by police activity, property crime is more strongly determined by poverty (positively) 
and is more reactive towards police expenditures (negatively). 
Other empirical studies build upon these findings.  Demombynes and Özler (2002) 
use a similar approach to investigate the case of South Africa.  They use cross-sectional data 
and a negative binomial regression to estimate various factors of property crime and violent 
crime.  The data is unique in that it is grouped by police jurisdictions, which are smaller areas 
than states or counties.  The study also considers inequality within and between racial groups, 
and considers each district’s relative wealth compared to those around it in order to account 
for the possibility that criminals might venture into other areas to commit crimes if those 
areas offered better opportunities.  They found that inequality has a significant impact unless 
police expenditure and unemployment are controlled for; violent crime cannot be explained 
by these same variables, revealing inequality to still be an important determinant of violent 
crime. 
Nilsson (2004) examines the relationship of inequality and crime in Swedish counties, 
using individual-level data across 27 years (1973-2000).  She uses an OLS regression and 
accounts for county and year fixed effects.  When investigating property crime, she finds that 
poverty has a significant impact, along with the proportion of divorcees (her results show that 
a 1% increase in the proportion of divorcees leads to a 20% increase in property crime).  The 
proportion of the population that is made up of foreign citizens also shows a positive 
relationship with crime levels.  Youth and inequality are not significant.  When considering 
violent crime, the only significant variable is the proportion of the population that is male, 
aged 15-24 years. 
Scorzafave and Soares (2009) add new possibilities to their examination of the link 
between income inequality and pecuniary crime.  They use data from municipalities of São 
Paulo State, Brazil, taking the average of information from the years 2002, 2003, and 2004.  
Their criminal data is unique in that it also includes crimes related to drug trafficking.  They 
look not only at economic factors, but also moral factors: for instance, they include the 
percentage of the population that professes to believe in a religion as a possible factor in 
determining crime rates.  They find that income inequality has a positive significant impact, 
along with median income levels, unemployment, and urbanization.  When considering moral 
costs, the percentage of the population aged 15-17, population with adolescent mothers, the 
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percentage of the population that professes no religion, and migration all have a positive 
impact on pecuniary crime rates. 
Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) take a cross-country sample to explore the 
relationship between inequality and crime across countries.  They use a lagged-variable 
GMM regression for panel data in their study, and find that while violent crime is stagnant 
over time, inequality does have a positive significant impact on crime.  GDP growth has a 
significant negative effect on crime.  While these results follow what would be expected 
given previous studies, Neumayer (2005) contests the certainty of the claim that inequality 
has a significant impact on crime.  His empirical tests show that, no matter how inequality is 
measured, it is insignificant in fixed effects and dynamic models.  It is only significant in 
random-effects models, or when the number of countries is sufficiently limited (such as in the 
previously discussed Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza study).  However, Neumayer does 
admit that some of this insignificance may spring from a poor estimator of inequality over 
time. 






















Table 1.  Literature Review: A Sampling of Empirical Studies 







considered: 1) number 
of court appearances by 
male youth in census 
tract communities of 
Chicago; 2) number of 
court appearances by 
male youth for 45 
suburbs of Chicago with 
populations over 
10,000; 3) number of 
arrests of males under 
25 for property crimes 
in 101 US cities; 4) 
number of arrests of 
males under 25 for 
violent crimes in 101 US 
cities.  All measured in 
rates per 1000 
population. 
Two income variables: 1) Mean 
family income for the second 
lowest quartile of families, to 
represent the economic level 
of the community; 2) Mean 
family income of the highest 
quartile of families, to 
represent payoff of certain 
crimes.  Also considers male 
civilian unemployment rate; 
the proportion of females 14 
years or older that are 
separated or divorced; percent 
of population living 
somewhere else five years 
ago; percent of the population 
that is nonwhite; a dummy 
variable to distinguish 
northern vs. southern cities. 
Fleischer states that there is a 
lack of evidence suggesting 
that the model is well-
specified.  He suspects that 
the phenomena behind the 
effects of income are also 
behind the effects of family 
instability on crime, although 
he notices that income 
makes a higher impact on 
those groups he shows to 
have a higher “taste” for 
crime. 
Each dependent variable 
was estimated using OLS, 
and the two largest 
samples (101 cities and 
Chicago communities) 
were divided into three 
subgroups according to 
the family stability value 
and evaluated separately 
as well.  The R2 were 
generally around .40, and 
always lower when the 
family stability variable 
was left out.  R2 was 
highest for dependent 
variable 1), using all 












Index Crimes: separated 
into categories 
(property and violent, 
and their subcategories) 
1-year lagged crime rate, 
probability of apprehension, 
average punishment, median 
family income, % families 
below one-half median 
income, % nonwhites, % males 
14-24 years of age, 
unemployment of urban male 
youth, labor force participation 
rate of young males, mean 
years of schooling for those 
over 25, % living in 
metropolitan areas, police 
expenditures, % male 
population, northern vs. 
southern state 
Found that unemployment 
rates were not steady across 
regressions.  Some showing 
that education and age are 
significant.  Inequality was 
also shown to be significant 
for determining property 
crime, and was consistent 
with other theoretical 
models. 
Used weighted OLS 
regressions; for property 
crime, R2 .75, for crimes 
against persons R2 .88.  
Also used two-stage least 
squares and obtained 
similar results.  Also 
regressed individual crime 








Property crime rates; 
robbery, burglary, 
larceny 
Rate of arrests, rate of 
convictions as a fraction of 
crimes, rate of convictions of a 
fraction of arrests, yearly 
income, yearly sales of retail 
outlets, average sentence for 
thieves, percent nonwhite 
population, mean years of 
schooling, population density, 
unemployment, percent 
population earning less than 
$3000 
Found tentative evidence of 
Becker’s theory.  Greater 
possibility of arrest did have 
an effect to lower crime, as 
did higher sentences. 
Used OLS; regressed 
crime rates on various 
arrest and conviction 
variables. First did not use 
unemployment or 
population earning less 
than 3000; however, the 
coefficient of income was 
negative and these two 
variables corrected for it.  
R2 for crimes regressed on 






Crime rate, both totals 
and broken down into 
various subcategories--
violent and property 
crimes 
population, population 
density, income Gini, (also 
used education Gini in some 
regressions), female headed 
households, nonwhite 
population, unemployment 
rate, poverty rate, residential 
mobility, percentage of youth, 
college education, police 
expenditure 
Possible endogeneity of 
police activity does not highly 
impact estimated 
coefficients.  Violent crime is 
little affected by police 
activity or poverty, but 
strongly affected by 
inequality (income or 
education)--following strain 
theory.  Property crime is not 
as affected by inequality, but 
is spurred on by poverty and 
somewhat deterred by police 
expenditure. 
Assuming exogeneity: 
Poisson regression, log 
linear.  Assuming 
endogeneity of police 
activity: 2-step GMM 
estimator using % 
democrat voters, per 
capita income, and share 
of non-police expenditure 
by local government as 
instruments.  When 
considering exogeneity, 
the residual deviance 
term for violent crime is 
8.102, for property 
22.493; using GMM, the H 
statistic shows there is 
















Looks specifically at 
homicide rates, rather 
than overall crime. 
Income Gini, median 
household income 
Shows a high correlation 
between income inequality 
and homicides.  The paper 
suggests this may be a result 
of "competitiveness."  Also in 
comparing US and Canada, 
with other variables held 
constant, Canada's more 
generous benefit systems 
seem to have negative 









Homicide, robbery. This 
looked at country-level 
data.  Between and 
within countries, pooled 
cross country, and as 
time series data.   
Gini index, GNP per capita 
(level of development), avg. 
years of education of adult 
population, level of 
urbanization, GDP growth rate 
(proxy for employment and 
general opportunities), lagged 
variable--crime from the 
previous period 
Found that violent crime has 
a high level of inertia over 
time.  Income inequality has 
a positive significant effect, 
while GDP growth has a 
significant negative effect on 
crime levels.  GNP, 
urbanization, and education 
levels all show no significant 
impact on crime. 
First assessed by OLS, but 
the model is not 
considered well-specified.  
When using GMM for 
dynamic (lagged-variable) 
models for panel data, the 
Sargan test indicates .651 










Crime levels, divided 
into categories of 
violent and property 
crimes (including 
subcategories of 
burglary, vehicle theft, 
robbery, rape, murder, 
serious assault) 
Mean expenditure in own 
jurisdiction, unemployment 
rate, a dummy to represent a 
jurisdiction as the richest in 
the area, inequality measures 
within and between racial 
groups, population density, 
female headed households, 
youth, and race 
Shows high correlation 
between property crimes and 
inequality until police 
expenditure and 
unemployment are controlled 
for; high correlation between 
violent crime and inequality is 
not accounted for by the 
same variables.  Most 
inequality is accounted for by 
inequality within racial 
groups, not between them.  
Sociological theories better 
explain violent crime rather 
than economic theories.  
Looked at possibility of 
criminals moving between 
areas in order to do their 
crimes in other jurisdictions 
before returning home with 
their loot. 
Negative binomial 
regression models, with 
various regressions 
selecting different 
independent variables.  
Most R2 registered at .38.  
Used probit to test for 










Property crime rates Wage distribution; conviction 
rates for property crimes, 
share of population aged 15-
24, sentence length, measure 
for returns on crime 
Found that the data 
supported the expectations 
of the model: that crime 
rates were higher at the 
lower end of the wage 
distribution, and that this 
relationship was more 
important than that of crime 
and unemployment.  
Deterrence measures have a 
large and significant impact 
on lowering crime rates, as 
does raising wages at the 
lower end of the wage 
distribution. 
Used OLS, OLS with a 
lagged dependent 
variable, and IV 
estimators and accounted 
for area and year fixed 
effects.  R2 for all 














the Case of 
Sweden 
(2004) 
Crime rates, both 
overall and broken 
down into property and 
violent categories 
Unemployment rate, 
proportion of population that 
is male aged 15-24, percent of 
the population that is made up 
o foreign citizens, percent 
population divorced, number 
of police officers, various 
measures of income 
inequality: 10/90; Gini; also 
considered 10 percentile and 
90 percentile separately 
Property crime: the 
percentage of relatively poor 
has the greatest impact.  As 
the proportion rises, so do 
crime rates, although the rate 
of change slows as the 
proportion grows.  The 
proportion of divorcees has a 
huge impact--a 1% increase 
shows a 20% increase in 
crimes. Foreign citizens are 
also positively correlated, 
and youth and inequality 
show little effect.  Violent 
crime: the only statistically 
important variable is the 
proportion of the population 
that is male aged 15-24. 
OLS, accounting for 
county and year fixed 
effects.  She uses 
individual level data for all 
Swedish counties.  When 
changing her dependent 
variable, her regressions 
yield R2 of .968 (total 
crime), .927 (burglary), 














per 1 million 
inhabitants 
Measure of inequality (Gini or 
top-to-bottom income ratio), 
GDP per capita, GDP growth 
rate, unemployment rate, 
urbanization rate, female labor 
force participation rate, males 
15-64, Polity measure of 
democracy, human rights 
violation measure (PPTS) 
No matter how inequality is 
measured, it is insignificant in 
fixed effects and dynamic 
models.  It is significant only 
in a random-effects model, 
unless the number of 
countries used is restricted to 
those used in by Fajnzylber, 
Lederman, and Loayza (2002) 
. Neumayer admits that part 
of this insignificance could 
come from a poor estimator 
of true inequality over time 
GMM lagged variable; 
fixed effects models; 
random effects models. 
For fixed effects models, 
R2 range from .21 to .62 
(depending on which 
independent variables are 
included).  For random 
effects, the R2 are .50 














Total crime rates 
(breakdowns of 
categories not available 
for Chinese provinces) 
Sex ratio, per capita income, 
unemployment rate, 
secondary school enrollment, 
income inequality (urban over 
rural), urbanization, age 
structure,  welfare 
expenditures, police 
expenditures, share of 
population that are 
immigrants (from other 
provinces) 
Urbanization and the sex 
ratio have significant impacts 
on crime.  In fact, as much as 
one-seventh of the increase 
in crime can be attributed to 
the overabundance of males 
in China. 
Performed panel data 
regressions for both OLS 
and IV estimators.  
Results were similar.  
When including all 
independent variables for 









The Case of 
Malaysia 
(2009) 
Total crime; burglary; 
violent crime; property 
crime; theft 
Gross household income 
inequality, computed from a 
regression relationship 
between Deininger and Squire 
inequality measures and UTIP-
UNIDO pay inequality 
measures 
Found that neither variable 
responded to any sort of 
shock to the other.  For the 
case of Malaysia, there is no 
meaningful relationship 
between any of the crimes 
studied and income 
inequality. 
Bounds testing (as in 
Pesaran et al.), with an 
autoregressive distributed 
lag framework.  Estimated 















crime rate per 100,000 
inhabitants, including 
drug trafficking offenses 
Income Gini, median income, 
unemployment, risk, school 
attendance, adolescent 
mother, people without 
religion, percentage aged 15-
17 years, migration, 
urbanization, metropolitan 
area. 
Income inequality has a 
positive, significant impact.  
Other economic factors--
median income and 
unemployment—are also 
significant.  Urbanization has 
a positive effect.  Of the 
"moral costs," proportion of 
population aged 15-17, 
school attendance,  no 
religion, adolescent mothers, 
and migration all show 
positive impacts. 
OLS with lagged variables, 
then, to control for spatial 
issues, also spatial 
autoregressive and spatial 
error models.  Using OLS 
with uncorrected crime 
data shows and R2 of 




5.  The Data: Sources and Definitions. 
 
A. The dependent variable 
 
Crime 
All crime data are taken from the 2000 FBI uniform crime reports.  Our crime is 
separated into two broad categories, as defined by the FBI: violent crime, which includes 
murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and property crime, which consists of 
burglary, larceny, and auto theft.  We will investigate property crime and violent crime 
independently.  We assess crime as the rate of crime per 1,000 persons. 
 
B. The independent variables: 
 
Inequality 
In order to measure income inequality, we use a Gini index constructed from the 
publicly available income distribution published by the US Census Bureau (Burkey, 2006).  
The distribution is based on household income with a bottom segment of less than $10000 
yearly and each interval increasing by $5000.  The top bracket consists of households earning 
$200,000 or more.  The income Gini here are not computed for individual level data because 
that data is not publicly available, which may mean these are not the true Gini indices.  
However, they are still a good representative of income inequality for these counties. 
 
We also include other factors, both economic and social, that should be considered as 
having an effect on crime.  All data are taken from the US Census Bureau’s 2000 Census, 
except where noted. These variables include: 
 
Total Population 




Population density is the number of inhabitants per square mile of land area.  As 
population density rises, it provides those with criminal intent with both more potential 
13 
 
targets and a higher degree of anonymity, which can lower the perpetrator’s chances of being 
caught (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). 
 
Unemployment 
We measure unemployment as the percentage of civilian labor force unemployed.  In 
an economic theory of crime, unemployment lessens the opportunity cost for committing 
crime, thereby making pecuniary crimes more attractive for the unemployed.  However, more 
recent studies suggest that this relationship between unemployment and crime may be 
insignificant (İmrohoroğlu, Merlo, and Rupert, 2004, among others). 
 
Race 
While the race of a person has little to do with potential criminality in and of itself, 
the racial situation might influence circumstances enough to make race factor into the 
decision of whether to commit crime or not.  Grogger (1998) discusses the lower levels of 
economic success attained by black males, for instance.  Texas also has a large group of 
Hispanics and Latinos, many of whom do not speak English well and find their educational 
and employment opportunities limited (27% speak predominately Spanish; 7% speak English 
“not well” or “not at all”).  Here we measure race as the percentage of the population who are 
non-white (including Latinos). 
 
Poverty 
Poverty is measured as the percentage of the population below the poverty line.  
Those with lower returns from legitimate market activity would find that crime has a higher 
expected payoff and would therefore be more likely to engage in criminal activity (Becker 
1968, Ehrlich 1973, and others). 
 
Family Instability 
Family instability is represented by the percentage of family households with minor 
children headed by a single female.  Several theories link this instability to crime.  One is that 
family breakups can lead to emotional damage in children, who then channel that into crime 
as they grow older; others dictate that this weak family structure leads to less structured 
lifestyles which can encourage unruly behavior in children and crime in the adults they 





Residential stability is measured by the percentage of the population who were living 
in the same home five years previously.  A stable location gives inhabitants more possibility 
of building a strong community in which others would be willing to step in on behalf of a 
neighbor if they were to witness a crime, and a strong community also lowers anonymity 
(which, as discussed above, can increase criminal activity). 
 
Police Expenditure 
We use police expenditure to represent the forces present in communities in order to 
discourage criminal activity.  Here, we have a question of endogeneity; higher levels of 
spending might indicate the preventative action keeping crime levels in their current state, or 
higher spending could be a reaction to increasing crime levels.  We measure police 
expenditure as the number of dollars spent on the county police force. 
 
Aged 15-24 
 We use the percentage of the population aged 15-24 to represent the age bracket most 
likely to commit crime.  
 
Female to Male Ratio 
We represent the female to male ratio as the percent of the population younger than 
40 years that is female.  A recent study suggests that as demographics change and men begin 
to outnumber women, the decrease in the number of married men amounts to the loss of a 
stabilizing societal force (Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang, 2007).  Without this stabilization, 
reckless behavior becomes more common and can cause crime levels to rise. 
 
Educational Attainment 
Higher levels of education can indicate both more socialization and more economic 
opportunities, both of which can reduce crime levels.  We measure educational attainment as 
the percentage of the population that has graduated high school or earned a GED. 
 
Gun Ownership 
 Gun ownership is represented by the proportion of the adult population that has been 
issued Concealed Handgun Licenses (a citizen must be 21 years of age in order to apply, 
except in very extenuating circumstances).  The data was taken from the Texas Department 
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of Public Safety.  Gun ownership is thought to have one of two effects on crime: either it 
makes it easier for criminals to obtain weapons, thereby increasing crime rates; or, it serves 
as a deterrent to crime because arming potential victims means the cost of crime may not only 
include the possibility of arrest and punishment, but also personal injury to the criminal.  This 
particular variable is also subject to possible endogeneity—it is not clear if more people apply 
for licenses as crime rises and they feel the need to protect themselves, or the increasing 
number of persons with CHL licenses impacts the number of people willing to commit crime. 
 
Religious Participation 
Religious participation is represented by the percentage of the population that is 
affiliated with a church or other religious congregation.  This affiliation can build community 
ties and reduce the anonymity of a population, even in large populations.  It can also indicate, 
as in Scorzafave and Soares (2009), a moral deterrent against crime.  Data were taken from 
Congregations and Membership in the United States 2000 (Jones, 2002), published by the 
Glenmary Research Center, which notes that traditional black Protestants are 





















6.  The Data: Descriptive Statistics. 
 
Summary Statistics. 
 Summary statistics for property crime and violent crime rates and explanatory 
variables are given in Table 2. 
 The correlation matrix is given in Appendix A.  A few variables are very highly 
correlated: the percentage of non-white residents and the percentage of the population over 
25 that are high school graduates have a high negative correlation (-.7588), family instability 
is highly correlated with poverty (.7735), and the percentage of high school graduates is also 
strongly correlated with poverty (-.8245). 
 Race is also correlated with poverty (.7274) and family instability (.6609).  The 
percentage of high school graduates is negatively correlated with both family instability (-
.6504) and unemployment (-.6223), and unemployment and poverty show a correlation 
coefficient of .6622.   
 Inequality is not highly correlated with violent crime or property crime. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Crime Rates and Explanatory Variables 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. kurtosis 
Property Crime Rate 23.40 19.80 0 66.06 14.61 0.62 0.90 0.24 
Violent Crime Rate 2.69 2.36 0 11.98 1.91 0.71 1.22 2.53 
Income Gini 0.4566 0.4585 0.3571 0.5660 0.0319 0.0697 -0.08 0.97 
Total Pop. 82094 17425 67 3400600 294540 3.59 8.05 75.60 
Pop. Density 86.17 20.55 0.10 2521.50 254.51 2.95 6.55 49.80 
Unemployment 4.79 4.30 2.50 16.80 1.83 0.38 3.52 17.86 
Race 35.95 32.10 4.20 98.00 20.929 0.58 1.02 0.63 
Poverty 17.28 16.48 0 50.89 6.6511 0.38 1.33 3.61 
Family Instability 4.44 4.25 0 13.38 2.0681 0.47 0.78 1.34 
Residential Stability 57.37 58.00 32.10 72.80 7.1545 0.12 -0.46 0.39 
Police Ex. Per Capita 97.10 80.91 0 2328.40 146.8 1.51 13.92 208.82 
Aged 15 - 24 13.85 13.73 5.97 35.75 3.02 0.21 2.27 12.03 
Female-Male Ratio 48.22 49.23 28.10 55.17 3.4528 0.07 -2.78 9.21 
High School Grad. 71.31 72.10 34.70 91.80 8.9099 0.12 -0.89 1.66 
Gun Owners 2.50 2.38 0.40 7.52 1.1649 0.47 0.87 1.36 
Religious Participation 65.51 62.87 8.96 100 17.215 0.26 0.18 -0.28 
 





Distributions of Selected Variables. 
 
 Here we can see the distribution of our dependent variables (violent crimes and 
property crimes) and two independent variables: poverty and inequality.  Poverty is thought 
to be one of the most important predictors of crime, as higher levels of poverty represent 
more people for whom crime present lowered opportunity costs of illegal activity.  Inequality 
is considered important because it can be representative of the possible payoffs of that illegal 
activity. 
 
Histogram 1.  
 
  
 In Histogram 1, we can see that the majority of counties have violent crime rates of 3 
or less violent crimes per 1000 population, and only 28 counties have violent crime rates of 
over 5 crimes per 1000 population.  Only two counties have violent crime rates exceeding 10 
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 Histogram 2 shows that property crimes are far more numerous than violent crimes.  
About half of all Texas counties have property crime rates of 20 per 1000 population or less.  





 Histogram 3 shows the frequency of poverty levels in Texas counties.  Most counties 
have poverty rates below 20% of their population; over three-quarters of counties (197 
counties) are in this range.  Only one county has a poverty rate of above 50%: Starr County, 





 Histogram 4 shows the distribution of income inequality across counties.  Loving 
County, with a population of 67 persons, has the lowest inequality (it also has the lowest Gini 
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7.  Methodology and Results. 
 
 Our model will take the form 
 
Crime Ratei = β0 + β1Ii +β2vi + β3Xi + β4pi + εi 
 
where Crime Rate represents the rate of crime per 1000 population, I is inequality, v is the 
poverty level, p is police expenditures per capita, and X denotes all other factors.  We expect 
β4 to carry a negative sign. 
 
Model 1. 
In our first model, we will assume that police expenditures and gun ownership rates 
are established independently of crime rates, as are all other variables.  Therefore, we will use 
OLS to perform our regressions.  The results from the OLS regressions are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population      Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Constant -39.8443 22.7873 0.0817 
 
Constant -2.6526 3.3854 0.4341 
Income Gini 34.4412 25.4518 0.1773 
 
Income Gini 2.9073 3.7812 0.4427 
Pop. Density 0.0115 0.0030 0.0002 
 
Pop. Density 0.0021 0.0004 0.0000 
Unemployment 0.9309 0.5300 0.0803 
 
Unemployment 0.0789 0.0787 0.3177 
Race 0.1282 0.0613 0.0376 
 
Race 0.0091 0.0091 0.3167 
Poverty -0.7640 0.2388 0.0016 
 
Poverty -0.1094 0.0355 0.0023 
Family Instability 2.9587 0.5354 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.4406 0.0795 0.0000 
Residential Stability -0.6424 0.1454 0.0000 
 
Residential Stability -0.0553 0.0216 0.0111 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0195 0.0048 0.0001 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita -0.0003 0.0007 0.6439 
Aged 15 - 24 0.7770 0.2886 0.0076 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.1044 0.0429 0.0156 
Female-Male Ratio 0.9848 0.2113 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1082 0.0314 0.0007 
High School Grad 0.2382 0.1735 0.1710 
 
High School Grad -0.0077 0.0258 0.7659 
Gun Owners 0.2223 0.6852 0.7459 
 
Gun Owners 0.0855 0.1018 0.4017 
Religious Participation -0.0506 0.0446 0.2580 
 
Religious Participation -0.0009 0.0066 0.8912 
R
2 




From these results we can see that property crimes and violent crimes are affected by 
some of the same significant factors: population density, poverty, family instability, and the 
male to female ratio, although with sometimes very different coefficients.  All of these 
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determinants of crime have the same sign for both property and violent crime, but the sizes of 
the coefficients are quite different in some cases—for instance, family instability. 
 We can also see that age, residential stability, and police expenditures have a 
significant impact on property crimes while they are not significant factors for violent crimes.  
In fact, our results show different signs for police expenditures: they are shown to have a 
positive significant impact on property crimes, but they have a negative insignificant impact 
on violent crimes. 
 Several of our coefficients seem to move in the opposite direction previously seen in 
the literature: poverty has a negative coefficient, while the percentage of females has a 
positive coefficient.  Inequality is not significant for either type of crime. 
 
Model 2. 
However, not all variables may be exogenous.  Police expenditures and gun 
ownership may be endogenous and dependent upon crime rates.  In order to assess this 
situation, we will use instruments to account for possible endogeneity and explain our 
endogenous variables.  We will consider four possible instruments.  First, we will look at 
total local area government revenue per capita; wealthier area governments are more likely to 
allocate higher amounts of money to police forces independently of crime.  Secondly, we will 
look non-police expenditure as a share of total revenue, because counties spending at higher 
levels will likely spend more on their police departments as well.  Third, we will look at per 
capita income, because richer residents can afford more independent crime protection, both 
by security personnel and by taking the necessary classes and tests to earn a concealed 
handgun license (and possibly purchase a firearm).  The fourth instrument is ratio of firearm 
instructors to citizens eligible for weapons licenses, as this indicates how convenient it is to 
obtain a license. 
 In order to use these instruments, we must first make sure they are suitable 
instrumental variables.  Including these four variables in property crime and violent crimes 
regressions show them to be insignificant as explanatory variables (including per capita 
income).  Regressing police expenditures on our possible instruments shows two to be 
significant (total revenues per capita and share of non-police expenditures) to be significant 
and have an R
2 
of .68.  We can show, then, that these are reasonable instruments for police 
expenditure per capita. 
 However, when considering the same four instruments for the percentage of the adult 
population that has obtained weapons licenses, the instruments’ explanatory power does not 
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seem quite as strong.  The ratio of applicants to instructors is significant, as is per capita 
income and share of non-police expenditures; however, when regressing the percentage of the 
population with CHL licenses on our instrumental variables, the R
2 
is .39. 
 We will use the Hausman and Sargan statistics and their corresponding p-values to 
confirm the use of instrumental variable regressions and the instruments’ suitability.  The 
Hausman statistic will appear significant if the OLS is indeed consistent and, therefore, the 
most efficient and preferred regression method.  The Sargan statistic will be significant if 
there is an issue with an instrument and the instrumental variable is not suitable. 
 Results from the two-stage instrumental variable estimation are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Two-stage Least Squares 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population      Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -56.2043 27.2306 0.0390 
 
Constant -4.5205 3.9075 0.2473 
Income Gini 58.9529 32.6026 0.0706 
 
Income Gini 6.3048 4.6783 0.1778 
Pop. Density 0.0107 0.0035 0.0020 
 
Pop. Density 0.0020 0.0005 0.0001 
Unemployment 0.8516 0.6258 0.1736 
 
Unemployment 0.0546 0.0898 0.5434 
Race 0.0452 0.0859 0.5987 
 
Race -0.0024 0.0123 0.8464 
Poverty -0.6893 0.2836 0.0151 
 
Poverty -0.0948 0.0407 0.0199 
Family Instability 2.4285 0.6797 0.0004 
 
Family Instability 0.3710 0.0975 0.0001 
Residential Stability -0.4990 0.1784 0.0051 
 
Residential Stability -0.0402 0.0256 0.1161 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0076 0.0076 0.3193 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita -0.0012 0.0011 0.2606 
Aged 15 - 24 0.4746 0.3662 0.1949 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0666 0.0525 0.2053 
Female-Male Ratio 1.1823 0.2605 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1315 0.0374 0.0004 
High School Grad 0.4507 0.2239 0.0442 
 
High School Grad 0.0173 0.0321 0.5906 
Gun Owners -5.6162 3.2143 0.0806 
 
Gun Owners -0.6608 0.4612 0.1519 
Religious Participation -0.1010 0.0564 0.0736 
 
Religious Participation -0.0067 0.0081 0.4075 
R
2
  =.4120             R
2  
=.2929 
Hausman p-value: .019                                           Hausman p-value: .154 
Sargan p-value: .346            Sargan p-value: .421 
 
 From these results, we can see that, like our OLS regressions, population density, 
family stability, and the percentage of females are significant for both property and violent 
crimes.  Residential stability is significant only for property crimes.  Other factors are not 
significant, including both poverty and inequality. 
 
Model 3. 
 In our previous regressions, gun ownership has been insignificant.  Exogeneity is 
questionable, and our available instruments with do not seem to have high explanatory 
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power.  If we remove this troublesome variable from our two-stage estimations, we find the 
results presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Two-stage Least Squares (gun ownership omitted) 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population      Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -42.8809 22.8292 0.0603 
 
Constant -2.9456 3.3818 0.3837 
Income Gini 32.5242 25.3572 0.1996 
 
Income Gini 3.2033 3.7563 0.3938 
Pop. Density 0.0115 0.0030 0.0001 
 
Pop. Density 0.0021 0.0004 0.0000 
Unemployment 1.0805 0.5373 0.0443 
 
Unemployment 0.0811 0.0796 0.3085 
Race 0.1350 0.0607 0.0262 
 
Race 0.0081 0.0090 0.3652 
Poverty -0.8158 0.2408 0.0007 
 
Poverty -0.1095 0.0357 0.0021 
Family Instability 2.9577 0.5330 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.4332 0.0790 0.0000 
Residencial Mobility -0.6021 0.1466 0.0000 
 
Residencial Mobility -0.0524 0.0217 0.0157 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0124 0.0061 0.0422 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita -0.0007 0.0009 0.4684 
Aged 15 - 24 0.7566 0.2873 0.0085 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0998 0.0426 0.0191 
Female-Male Ratio 1.0136 0.2112 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1115 0.0313 0.0004 
High School Grad 0.2700 0.1730 0.1187 
 
High School Grad -0.0040 0.0256 0.8746 
Religious Participation -0.0594 0.0446 0.1826 
 
Religious Participation -0.0018 0.0066 0.7853 
R
2
 =.5285            R
2
 =.3972 
Hausman p-value: .052          Hausman p-value: .630 
Sargan p-value: .681           Sargan p-value: .314 
 
 When we compare these results to those of our other models, we see that they are 
much more similar to the results of our OLS regressions.  The only significance change is in 
police expenditures, which appear significant in our OLS regressions for property crime but 
are not in our two-stage regressions for property crime.  Coefficients for each variable are 
similar.  Inequality is not considered significant for either category of crime.  Poverty is 
significant but carries a negative coefficient for both property and violent crime. 
 
Model 4. 
 In our first three sets of regressions, we did not weight our observations.  All variables 
were presented as rates, and therefore the size of each county was accounted for.  In this 
model, we will add the population dimension by weighting our regression on total county 
population. 





Table 6. Weighted Ordinary Least Squares 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population       Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -76.0639 29.2390 0.0099 
 
Constant -12.6306 4.1816 0.0028 
Income Gini -10.8012 40.9013 0.7919 
 
Income Gini 20.8438 5.8494 0.0004 
Pop. Density 0.0042 0.0013 0.0015 
 
Pop. Density 0.0012 0.0002 0.0000 
Unemployment -1.1988 0.7422 0.1076 
 
Unemployment 0.0196 0.1061 0.8533 
Race 0.1894 0.0721 0.0092 
 
Race 0.0196 0.0103 0.0584 
Poverty 0.3248 0.4546 0.4756 
 
Poverty -0.2211 0.0650 0.0008 
Family Instability 4.3448 0.8084 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.6342 0.1156 0.0000 
Residencial Mobility -0.6416 0.1956 0.0012 
 
Residencial Mobility -0.0171 0.0280 0.5423 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0447 0.0260 0.0869 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0067 0.0037 0.0745 
Aged 15 - 24 0.1001 0.3053 0.7433 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0997 0.0437 0.0233 
Female-Male Ratio 1.4645 0.3363 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1560 0.0481 0.0013 
High School Grad 0.4920 0.2253 0.0299 
 
High School Grad -0.0310 0.0322 0.3366 
Gun Owners 0.2574 1.2250 0.8338 
 
Gun Owners 0.0639 0.1752 0.7156 
Religious Participation 0.1542 0.0682 0.0246 
 
Religious Participation 0.0016 0.0097 0.8709 
R
2
 =.6774             R
2
 =.7570 
 In these results, several of the factors shown to be significant in our other regressions 
also appear here: population density, family instability, and the percentage of females have 
been determined significant in every regression.  We also see that race and residential 
stability are also significant for property crimes, although poverty and inequality are not. 
 For violent crime, however, we find that both poverty and inequality are significant.  
Of note, however, is the fact that poverty carries a negative sign. 
 
Model 5. 
 Once again considering the endogeneity of police expenditures and gun ownership—
especially for property crime, we will use instrumental variables to account for that 
possibility.  We will use the same instruments as in Model 2.  The results for our weighted 











Table 7. Weighted Two-Stage Least Squares 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population       Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -98.7204 31.0610 0.0017 
 
Constant -13.6250 4.5357 0.0029 
Income Gini 9.9136 51.0319 0.8461 
 
Income Gini 19.8272 7.4519 0.0083 
Pop. Density 0.0084 0.0017 0.0000 
 
Pop. Density 0.0015 0.0002 0.0000 
Unemployment 0.0321 0.7663 0.9667 
 
Unemployment 0.1314 0.1119 0.2415 
Race -0.5024 0.1859 0.0074 
 
Race -0.0515 0.0271 0.0590 
Poverty -0.2608 0.5779 0.6522 
 
Poverty -0.2422 0.0844 0.0045 
Family Instability 4.8565 1.0282 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.6208 0.1501 0.0000 
Residential Stability 0.4500 0.3195 0.1602 
 
Residential Stability 0.0923 0.0467 0.0490 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0865 0.0667 0.1961 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0160 0.0097 0.1010 
Aged 15 - 24 0.1568 0.3053 0.6081 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0983 0.0446 0.0285 
Female-Male Ratio 1.9596 0.3595 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1912 0.0525 0.0003 
High School Grad 0.6133 0.2267 0.0073 
 
High School Grad -0.0151 0.0331 0.6495 
Gun Owners -18.4007 4.3826 0.0000 
 
Gun Owners -1.7653 0.6400 0.0063 
Religious Participation -0.0398 0.0869 0.6469 
 
Religious Participation -0.0196 0.0127 0.1245 
R
2  
=.6960             R
2
 =.7612 
Hausman p-value: .269           Hausman p-value: .641 
Sargan p-value: 1.000*           Sargan p-value: 1.000* 
*The statistic is less than one; it appears as 1.000 due to rounding. 
 
Here we can see that, once again, population density, family instability, and the 
female-male ratio are all significant for both types of crime.  The percentage of the 
population owning a gun is also a significant negative factor for both types of crime, although 
it has a much larger impact on property crime than it does on violent crime.  Race and the 
percentage of the population that are high school graduates are also significant factors for 
property crime. 
 For violent crime, we see a different set of significant factors aside from those 
mentioned above: poverty and inequality are additional significant variables.  In fact, the 





Additional Considerations: Measure of Poverty 
 
In our regressions we have been using the total poverty rate.  However, Kelly (2000) 
suggests that this measure includes people who are generally unsuited for criminal activity, as 
many people in poverty are young children or elderly, and excluding these age groups from 
the poverty statistic would be a more precise measure of poverty’s impact on crime.  We have 
run our weighted two-stage least squares regressions using this reduced poverty rate to 
investigate the impact of this observation.  We compare the results in Table 8. 
Table 8.  Comparison of Reduced Poverty Rates and Total Poverty Rates. 
 
Property Crime Rates Total Poverty Only Violent Crime Rates 
 
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Total Poverty -0.2608 0.5779 0.6522 
 
Total Poverty -0.2422 0.0844 0.0045 
 
Total Poverty and Reduced Poverty 
 
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Total Poverty -0.76279 1.0388 0.4635 
 
Total Poverty -0.46445 0.150808 0.0023 
Reduced Poverty 0.863224 1.48338 0.5612 
 
Reduced Poverty 0.3821 0.21535 0.0773 
 
Reduced Poverty Only 
 
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Reduced Poverty -0.04133 0.825609 0.9601 
 
Reduced Poverty -0.16866 0.122076 0.1684 
 
 From our comparison, we can see that the reduced poverty rate is not significant.  
However, even when regressed alongside the reduced poverty rate, total poverty is significant 
for violent crime.  Interestingly, when regressed together, the two poverty measures show 
different signs. 






Additional Considerations: The Classification of Crime 
 
We have been using the FBI’s criminal classifications throughout this paper.  By these 
standards, robbery is considered a violent crime.  While robbery is indeed a violent crime, it 
is also arguably property crime, and it is reasonable to think that a person committing such an 
act might be driven by pecuniary interests.   This argument is not strong for the other 
categories of violent crimes (murder, forcible rape, and aggravated assault).  Changing this 
classification to consider robbery a property crime rather than a violent crime might better 
highlight the factors contributing to strictly pecuniary crimes and those with little to no 
monetary payoff.  The results of these regressions can be seen in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Weighted Two Stage Least Squares (adjusted crime classifications) 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population       Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant 101.1130 31.2232 0.0014 
 
Constant -11.2319 4.0794 0.0063 
Income Gini 17.4120 51.2983 0.7346 
 
Income Gini 12.3288 6.7022 0.0671 
Pop. Density 0.0094 0.0017 0.0000 
 
Pop. Density 0.0006 0.0002 0.0086 
Unemployment 0.1262 0.7703 0.8700 
 
Unemployment 0.0373 0.1006 0.7114 
Race -0.5047 0.1869 0.0074 
 
Race -0.0493 0.0244 0.0448 
Poverty -0.3265 0.5809 0.5746 
 
Poverty -0.1765 0.0759 0.0209 
Family Instability 4.9559 1.0335 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.5215 0.1350 0.0001 
Residential Stability 0.4501 0.3211 0.1623 
 
Residential Stability 0.0922 0.0420 0.0289 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0901 0.0671 0.1806 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0125 0.0088 0.1564 
Aged 15 - 24 0.1686 0.3069 0.5832 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0864 0.0401 0.0321 
Female-Male Ratio 1.9657 0.3614 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1851 0.0472 0.0001 
High School Grad 0.6057 0.2279 0.0084 
 
High School Grad -0.0075 0.0298 0.8004 
Gun Owners -18.5165 4.4054 0.0000 
 
Gun Owners -1.6494 0.5756 0.0045 
Religious Participation -0.0452 0.0873 0.6050 
 
Religious Participation -0.0142 0.0114 0.2155 
R
2
 =.7203            R
2
 =.5461 
 Here we can see that the determinants of property crime do not appear to differ 
greatly.  The same factors are significant, and the coefficients are close.  For violent crime, 
however, income inequality and poverty are no longer significant, and there is more variation 





8.  Conclusions. 
 
 After conducting regressions in various specifications, it can be seen for this data set 
that inequality is not necessarily a good predictor of total crime.  It did not appear as a 
significant factor for property crime, although, as seen in previous studies (such as Kelly 
(2000) and Demombynes and Özler (2002)), it is large and significant in the case of violent 
crime.  This seems to fall in line with strain theory, rather than an economic theory, although 
some violent crimes may be conducted with pecuniary intent (as with the case of robbery). 
Poverty was not a consistently significant factor, which was somewhat unexpected.  
Also of interest is that in almost every case, poverty has a negative coefficient, including 
those regressions in which it is significant.  It is possible that this is explained by the gap 
between those people who are making enough money to support themselves and those who 
are poor enough to qualify for various welfare programs.  As more people fall below the 
income limit for state programs and are able to obtain goods through these avenues, crime 
may no longer look like an attractive option. 
 The three factors that appear significant throughout all regressions are population 
density (as expected), family instability (as expected), and the female-to male ratio.  The fact 
that family instability has a large significant impact on both types of crime seems to validate 
social disorganization theory.  The importance of this particular variable is well known and 
has been for some time; Fleisher (1966) also used it as one of his independent variables.  The 
recurring importance of the percentage of residents staying in the same home for five years or 
more also hints at the importance of a strong community as a crime deterrent. 
 The significance of the female-to-male ratio is not altogether unexpected but for the 
fact that the sign is always positive, the opposite of what would seem likely.  In fact, it is in 
direct opposition to Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang (2007), who found that the increase in males 
can account for as much as one-seventh of the crime increase in China under the 
government’s one-child policy. 
 From these data, it appears that controlling economic circumstances would not have 
the strong impact on crime that policymakers might hope.  While poverty and inequality 
might be considered ills of society for other reasons, based on these data they have less 
impact on crime than social factors.  Rather, focusing on social issues (though probably more 
difficult) seems to be the key to reducing crime.  Even poverty, which is appears to be 
significant in some specifications, is highly correlated to family instability, though this paper 
does not prove any causal links. 
28 
 
 In order to test these results, longitudinal tests would be beneficial.  Also, obtaining 
individual-level data might produce more precise measures of poverty and especially 
inequality.  Considering the percentage of individuals earning just above the income limit for 
social welfare programs as a possible factor of crime might also yield some insight into the 














9.  Appendices 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Property Crime Rate Number of property crimes per 1000 population, 2000 
Violent Crime Rate Number of violent crimes per 1000 population, 2000 
  
Independent Variables 
Income Gini Gini Index for household incomes, 2000 
Total Population County population, total, 2000 
Population Density Number of persons per square mile, 2000 
Unemployment Unemployment rate, 2000 
Race Percentage non-white (including Latino) population, 2000 
Poverty Percentage population living below the poverty line, 2000 
Family Instability Percentage of households with minor children headed by a single female, 2000 
Residential Stability Percentage of population living in the same house as five years previous, 2000 
Police Ex. Per Capita Dollars spent per person on police force, 1997 
Aged 15 -24 Percentage of population aged 15 -24 years, 2000 
Female to Male Ratio Percentage of population 40 years or younger that is female, 2000 
High School Grad. Percentage of 25 year olds and older that graduated high school, 2000 
Gun Owners Percentage of citizens eligible to obtain CHL that are licensed, 2000 
Religious Participation Percentage of the population actively affiliated with a religious congregation, 2000 
  
Instruments 
Per Capita Income Income per capita, 1999 
Total Revenues Per Capita Local area government revenues per capita, 1997 
Share Non-Police 
Expenditure 
Local area government expenditures excluding police as a share of total revenue, 
1997 
















Weighted Two-Stage Least Squares (including poverty and reduced poverty rates) 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population       Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -84.2257 39.8479 0.0356 
 
Constant -7.2091 5.7849 0.2139 
Income Gini 1.5472 53.0862 0.9768 
 
Income Gini 16.1238 7.7068 0.0375 
Pop. Density 0.0083 0.0017 0.0000 
 
Pop. Density 0.0015 0.0002 0.0000 
Unemployment 0.0717 0.7704 0.9259 
 
Unemployment 0.1489 0.1118 0.1842 
Race -0.5006 0.1862 0.0077 
 
Race -0.0507 0.0270 0.0619 
Poverty -0.7628 1.0388 0.4635 
 
Poverty -0.4644 0.1508 0.0023 
Reduced Poverty 0.8632 1.4834 0.5612 
 
Reduced Poverty 0.3821 0.2154 0.0773 
Family Instability 5.0799 1.0988 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.7197 0.1595 0.0000 
Residential Stability 0.4599 0.3204 0.1524 
 
Residential Stability 0.0967 0.0465 0.0387 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0836 0.0670 0.2137 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0147 0.0097 0.1311 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0091 0.3973 0.9817 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0329 0.0577 0.5689 
Female-Male Ratio 1.8559 0.4017 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1452 0.0583 0.0134 
High School Grad 0.5623 0.2433 0.0217 
 
High School Grad -0.0376 0.0353 0.2880 
Gun Owners -18.6751 4.4139 0.0000 
 
Gun Owners -1.8867 0.6408 0.0036 
Religious Participation -0.0323 0.0879 0.7136 
 
Religious Participation -0.0162 0.0128 0.2051 
R
2




Weighted Two-State Least Squares (reduced poverty rates only) 
Property Crime Rates per 1000 population      Violent Crime Rates per 1000 population 
 
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  
Coefficient Std. error p-value 
Constant -95.8276 36.5465 0.0093 
 
Constant -14.2732 5.4038 0.0088 
Income Gini -5.3508 52.1983 0.9184 
 
Income Gini 11.9238 7.7181 0.1237 
Pop. Density 0.0083 0.0017 0.0000 
 
Pop. Density 0.0015 0.0003 0.0000 
Unemployment -0.0816 0.7408 0.9124 
 
Unemployment 0.0556 0.1095 0.6123 
Race -0.5169 0.1847 0.0056 
 
Race -0.0606 0.0273 0.0274 
Reduced Poverty -0.0413 0.8256 0.9601 
 
Reduced Poverty -0.1687 0.1221 0.1684 
Family Instability 4.5586 0.8380 0.0000 
 
Family Instability 0.4024 0.1239 0.0013 
Residential Stability 0.4683 0.3199 0.1445 
 
Residential Stability 0.1018 0.0473 0.0323 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.1041 0.0608 0.0883 
 
Police Ex. Per Capita 0.0273 0.0090 0.0027 
Aged 15 - 24 0.1074 0.3737 0.7741 
 
Aged 15 - 24 0.0927 0.0553 0.0946 
Female-Male Ratio 1.8872 0.3991 0.0000 
 
Female-Male Ratio 0.1643 0.0590 0.0058 
High School Grad 0.6735 0.1903 0.0005 
 
High School Grad 0.0301 0.0281 0.2860 
Gun Owners -18.3701 4.3901 0.0000 
 
Gun Owners -1.7010 0.6491 0.0093 
Religious Participation -0.0449 0.0862 0.6030 
 
Religious Participation -0.0239 0.0127 0.0622 
R
2
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